Time’s Up: A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal Legislation by Zaccagnini, Ashley Jo
SMU Law Review Forum 
Volume 74 Article 3 
4-2021 
Time’s Up: A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal 
Legislation 
Ashley Jo Zaccagnini 
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulrforum 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ashley Jo Zaccagnini, Time’s Up: A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal Legislation, 74 
SMU L. REV. F. 55 (2021) 
https://doi.org/10.25172/slrf.74.1.3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review Forum by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more 
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
SMU Law Review Forum 
Volume 74 April 2021 55–91 
55 
TIME’S UP: A CALL TO ERADICATE 
NCAA MONOPSONY THROUGH 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Ashley Jo Zaccagnini* 
Few traditions are as near and dear to the hearts of Americans as college athletics. The 
institution holds a special place in society because it reflects the ultimate convergence of 
those values that uniquely define the United States: loyalty, competitiveness, and pride. 
However, the notion of basic fairness seems to have been excluded along the way, as the 
commercialization of college athletics gave way to total dominance over the industry by the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA promulgates sports rules 
and organizes collegiate-level championships, but its most influential role involves promoting 
“amateurism,” or the notion that student-athletes are not entitled to compensation because 
college athletics should be about the love of the game, not monetization. While amateurism 
may be touted as an honorable principle aimed at preserving the character of college athletics 
and its differences from professional sports, the principle is more difficult to justify at a time 
when the NCAA earns $1.1 billion per year in revenue, none of which is shared among 
student-athletes who work full-time and typically live below the poverty line. 
Last year, state legislators paused to consider whether any justification exists for 
continuing to adhere to the NCAA’s archaic system of denying compensation to student -
athletes in light of the fact that “amateurism” holds no significance in a legal sense. Given 
the lack of any such justification, the California legislature became the first to explicitly 
defy the NCAA in passing the Fair Pay to Play Act in September of 2019. Since then, a 
number of states have followed suit by drafting nearly identical laws that would likewise 
have the effect of permitting student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their name, 
image, and likeness (NIL). Unsurprisingly, NCAA leadership vehemently condemned the 
movement at first, threatening to strip member institutions affected by the new legislation 
from the organization altogether. The NCAA has since reneged on its hostile position, 
making a public commitment to reform its policies so as to authorize paid endorsement 
opportunities for student-athletes on some level. However, the organization will undoubtedly 
attempt to minimize the impact of the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny whether through 
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litigation or by crafting new restrictive policies ultimately aimed at nullifying the effects of 
new laws. Admittedly, the state-by-state approach to adopting a new stance on athlete 
compensation comes with a number of practical challenges, thereby providing fertile ground 
for the NCAA to launch powerful objections. 
This Comment aims to present a workable solution in the form of a comprehensive 
federal law, which would secure the rights of student-athletes to earn compensation for use 
of their NILs before the NCAA is given the opportunity to preempt the significance of that 
right. While several congressmen have drafted federal laws related to the topic of NIL rights 
in this context, this Comment identifies particular issues that have been overlooked at the 
state level thus far, recommending specific provisions that would not only embrace student-
athletes’ rights in principle as a matter of basic fairness, but make those rights a practicable 
and economically feasible reality. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has 
monopolized the college-sports industry and persistently invoked the principle of 
“amateurism” as a justification for denying the right of college athletes to benefit 
financially from use of their name, image, and likeness (NIL).1 Student-athletes 
have attempted to assert their right to compensation through litigation, primarily 
attacking the NCAA on both antitrust and labor and employment grounds.2 
While courts have traditionally deferred to amateurism as necessary to preserve 
the popularity of college athletics and the value of higher education,3 the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent O’Bannon v. NCAA decision called the NCAA’s model into 
question, reflecting public sentiment in asserting that no legal basis exists on 
which to deny the right of student-athletes to be compensated for use of their 
NILs.4 California legislators responded to the landmark decision by passing the 
Fair Pay to Play Act in September 2019,5 inspiring at least nine other states to 
draft or pass bills similarly aimed at granting student-athletes the ability to benefit 
financially from the use of their NILs.6 In response to the Fair Pay to Play Act, the 
 
 1. NCAA, 2020-21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2.9 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION 
I MANUAL]. 
 2. Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
475, 495–97 (2015). 
 3. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
 4. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063–79 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 5. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019). 
 6. Charlotte Carroll, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS 
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NCAA threatened to expel California’s colleges and universities from its league, 
but tempered that position within a month as the number of state legislatures 
signaling agreement with California’s position increased.7 Rather than strip 
institutions of NCAA membership, the organization instead promised to consider 
adopting new bylaws that would permit athletes to be compensated for 
endorsements by January 2021.8 
As of April 2021, the NCAA has avoided its commitment to reform by 
continuously delaying consideration of new bylaws despite its apparent 
willingness to concede.9 Unfortunately for the NCAA, however, the United States 
Supreme Court is not waiting around. On March 31, 2021, the Court expressed 
collective disdain toward “amateurism” during oral arguments in the case of 
NCAA v. Alston.10 Even March Madness could not distract sports commentators 
from realizing that with Justices on both ends of the ideological spectrum blasting 
criticisms against the NCAA, amateurism’s days are likely numbered.11 Yet, a win 
for student-athletes in Alston—which asks whether the NCAA can legally restrict 
the payment of modest, education-related sums to players—would not necessarily 
make the unqualified right to NIL compensation a reality.12 Rather, as states 
continue adopting NIL statutes one-by-one, the NCAA’s defense against 
compliance is strengthened based on its practical inability to comply with varying 
or even contradictory mandates. This Comment will analyze the numerous angles 
from which the NCAA could still prevent the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny 
from having any effect, highlighting the practical obstacles states failed to consider 
in drafting new laws that could drastically undermine the goal of achieving fair 
compensation for student-athletes. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that an 
innovative, yet logistically feasible solution in the form of a comprehensive federal 
law granting student-athletes the right to earn NIL compensation is necessary. 
Part II of this Comment will describe the history of the NCAA and the 
organization’s commitment to the principle of amateurism, which underlies the 
legal context to be discussed in Part III. Part IV will discuss the movement 
supporting expanded student-athlete compensation rights as spurred by 
 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fair-play-
image-likeness-laws [https://perma.cc/PKZ9-T3X5]. 
 7. See Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image, and Likeness Opportunities, NCAA 
(Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-
governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/4U8Y-
R5MM]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Delay, 
NCAA (Jan. 15, 2021 1:36 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/student-athlete-committees-issue-joint-statement-name-image-likeness-legislation-delay 
[https://perma.cc/3EUP-EPKS]. 
 10. Ross Dellenger, Supreme Court Rips Into NCAA System, But a Win for Athletes’ Rights is Far 
From Guaranteed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 31, 2021), 
https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/31/supreme-court-alston-ncaa-athletes-rights 
[https://perma.cc/7YMY-JHD3]. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1264 (9th Cir.) (“Contrary to Student-Athletes’ 
understanding, this analysis reflects the judgment that limits on cash compensation unrelated to 
education do not, on this record, constitute anticompetitive conduct and, thus, may not be 
enjoined.”), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020). 
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California’s passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, in addition to providing an 
overview of similar proposed legislation under consideration in a number of 
states. Part V will analyze potential legal challenges compromising the validity of 
the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny, questioning whether perpetuating the 
notion that student-athletes should be compensated for endorsements is 
worthwhile given the practical challenges and potential disadvantages associated 
with the policy. Ultimately, this Comment will conclude that (1) continuing the 
fight for student-athlete compensation rights is necessary given the advantages to 
be gained from such a policy; and (2) codifying that right in the form of a 
comprehensive federal law as set forth in Part VI will alleviate the complexities 
and practical challenges associated with the state-by-state approach to legislating 
college athletes’ NIL rights. 
II.  THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 
The NCAA was born out of necessity during President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
administration, primarily as a means for encouraging safer practices in men’s 
college football.13 In the year 1905 alone, the sport caused eighteen deaths and 
hundreds of injuries.14 Consequently, the President facilitated the creation of the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association (renamed the NCAA in 1910), charging its 
sixty-two original members with the task of formulating intercollegiate sports 
regulations.15 For most of the twentieth century, the NCAA’s role was confined 
to rulemaking and tournament scheduling until profitability and heightened 
public interest in college sports materialized in accordance with the advent of 
television.16 NCAA executives capitalized on the opportunity to increase the 
organization’s enforcement power in the 1940s and 1950s by establishing 
restrictive policies designed to alleviate exploitative recruitment practices, while at 
the same time securing television contracts valued in excess of one million 
dollars.17 Since that period, the NCAA’s sophistication, scope, and revenue-
generating capacity have increased even more substantially.18 
Today, the NCAA defines itself as “an organization dedicated to providing a 
pathway to opportunity for college athletes,” of which more than 1,100 colleges 
and universities are members.19 Together with athletics conferences spanning the 
country, the NCAA facilitates sports competitions involving 19,500 teams and 
nearly half a million students.20 The NCAA conducts ninety national 
championships every year, providing college athletes the opportunity to compete 
at the highest level in a variety of college sports ranging from men’s football to 
 
 13. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in 
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 13–14. 
 17. Id. at 14–15. 
 18. Id. at 21. 
 19. NCAA, 2020-21 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE 2 (2020), 
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/Student_Resources/CBSA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UP8W-VNES]. 
 20. Id. 
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women’s equestrian.21 Member schools are organized into three NCAA divisions, 
with Division I schools offering the largest budgets, scholarship opportunities, 
and student bodies.22 Division I schools may award athletic scholarships covering 
tuition and fees, room and board, plus other school-related expenses.23 However, 
fewer than 2% of high school athletes secure an NCAA sports scholarship in any 
division each year,24 and those who do are only awarded an average of 
$18,000.00.25 
A.  NCAA REGULATIONS 
The NCAA is widely perceived as one of the most important regulatory bodies 
in the sports industry, though its requirements for eligibility are often viewed as 
burdensome and even controversial due to their restrictiveness.26 The 
organization’s current Division I manual alone sets forth 408 pages of bylaws 
governing member institutions and their athletes.27 The bylaws are promulgated 
at an annual convention by member representatives serving on committees that 
propose NCAA policies.28 While member institutions thus decide which policies 
are to be adopted and implemented on campuses, NCAA employees ultimately 
interpret the organization’s rules.29 The NCAA’s enforcement power also depends 
on the work of committees within the organization itself, beginning with 
enforcement investigations staff tasked with inspecting potential infractions.30 
Depending on the seriousness of a given violation, the enforcement process may 
proceed in the form of a negotiated resolution, summary disposition track, or 
hearing track, all of which the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions (COI) 
oversees.31 The NCAA defines the COI as an “independent administrative body” 
consisting of volunteers from member institutions and their employees.32 In 
accordance with the bylaws, the COI is empowered to “conduct hearings or 
reviews, find facts, conclude violations of NCAA legislation, prescribe appropriate 
penalties and monitor institutions on probation to ensure compliance with 
penalties.”33 
 
 21. Id. at 3. 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. Id. 




 26. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 12:3 (2019). 
 27. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1. 
 28. Id. art. 5.1.1.1; What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/5UZQ-AQDS]. 
 29. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 5.4.1.2.1; What is the NCAA?, supra note 28. 
 30. Division I Infractions Process, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/division-i-
infractions-process [https://perma.cc/N8VN-W28Y]. 
 31. Id.; Division I Committee on Infractions, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/divis ion-i-committee-infractions 
[https://perma.cc/QHD4-4FX3]. 
 32. Division I Committee on Infractions, supra note 31. 
 33. Id. 
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B.  THE NCAA’S COMMITMENT TO AMATEURISM 
The lengthy and complex nature of the NCAA’s regulatory scheme may be 
explained by the organization’s commitment to the principle of amateurism, 
which the NCAA cites as essential to maintaining “a clear line of demarcation 
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”34 Amateur status 
depends on participation being “motivated primarily by education and by the 
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived” from college athletics as an 
“avocation,” not an occupation.35 According to the NCAA, amateurism also 
encompasses the notion that “student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”36 
The NCAA’s concern with preventing the professionalization of college 
athletics underlies all of its regulations. For instance, the recruitment process is 
heavily regulated, providing for short contact periods and limited opportunities 
during which member institutions may communicate with high school athletes, 
with different sets of rules applying to face-to-face introductions, telephone calls, 
and “official” visitation days.37 Even after a student-athlete officially commits to a 
member institution, he or she must provide evidence of amateur status by 
obtaining an amateurism certificate prior to obtaining eligibility at a Division I or 
II school.38 Further, participation in any of the following activities may 
compromise a student-athlete’s amateur status: receiving payment from a sports 
team for participation; engaging a professional marketing or sports agent; 
accepting prize money; or promoting commercial products or services.39 
Moreover, the NCAA imposes strict academic policies, requiring its athletes to be 
enrolled in a full schedule of classes at all times during the academic year and to 
maintain a minimum grade point average based on the member institution’s 
general requirements.40 A violation of any of the aforementioned bylaws relating 
to recruitment, amateur status, or academics may result in immediate ineligibility 
for the member institution or student-athlete involved.41 
III.  LEGAL CONTEXT 
A.  EARLY LEGAL CHALLENGES TO NCAA REGULATIONS: AMATEURISM 
PREVAILS 
While amateurism is not a legally binding principle, the NCAA’s commitment 
to preserving the amateur status of college sports has allowed it to survive 
numerous legal challenges by student-athletes opposing its restrictive policies. For 
 
 34. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 1.3.1. 
 35. Id. art. 2.9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. arts. 13.02, 13.1. 
 38. Amateurism, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism 
[https://perma.cc/65QS-KH8M]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, arts. 14.2.1, 14.4.3.3. 
 41. Id. arts. 3.2.5, 12.11.1. 
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instance, in the early 1990s, a running back for the University of Notre Dame 
sued the NCAA upon losing his collegiate eligibility by entering the NFL draft, 
even though he was not ultimately selected.42 The player invoked § 1 of the 
Sherman Act—which “makes it unlawful for anyone to contract, combine in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspire, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several states”43—in challenging the NCAA’s “no-draft” rule on the grounds 
that the rule had an anticompetitive effect on the sports industry.44 The NCAA 
argued the rule was necessary to ensure student-athletes’ profit-making objectives 
would not overshadow their educational goals, and that overturning the rule 
would “blur the line between college and professional football, and create a 
number of potential problems for the effective management of teams engaged in 
college football.”45 The court agreed with the NCAA’s rationale, citing the 
“significant procompetitive effects” of the amateurism principle.46 
Also in 1990, a Vanderbilt University football player lost his suit against the 
NCAA in a nearly identical antitrust case challenging the NCAA’s “no-agent” 
rule.47 The plaintiff relied on a landmark Supreme Court case from six years prior 
in arguing the NCAA’s regulations are commercial in nature and therefore subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.48 However, the court turned to a Fifth Circuit case49 to 
explain the “clear difference between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising 
of college football games and the NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernable line 
between amateurism and professionalism.”50 Essentially, while the court 
recognized that the NCAA and its multimillion dollar annual budget were not 
totally exempt from antitrust regulation because its television contracts were clearly 
commercial in nature, it created a narrow exception for eligibility rules solely 
intended to preserve amateurism.51 
While the courts in Banks and Gaines gave credence to amateurism where 
collegiate football players had engaged in activities unquestionably characteristic 
of professional football, the court in Bloom v. NCAA refused to permit a student-
athlete to benefit financially from endorsement deals even though they were 
unrelated to his NCAA sport altogether.52 In compliance with NCAA 
regulations,53 the plaintiff competed as a member of his university football team 
while simultaneously pursuing a career in professional skiing.54 Prior to 
 
 42. Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 853–54 (N.D. Ind. 1990). 
 43. Id. at 857–58; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 44. Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 855, 860. 
 45. Id. at 860–61. 
 46. Id. at 862. 
 47. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740–41 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (mem. op.). 
 48. Id. at 743 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (holding 
that the NCAA’s television restrictions violated § 1 of the Sherman Act)). 
 49. Id. at 744 (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148–49 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 50. Id. at 743. 
 51. Id. at 744 (citing Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1148–49). 
 52. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626–27 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 625. The athlete relied “on NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2, which states that ‘[a] professional 
athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a different sport.’” Id. (alteration in 
original). 
 54. Id. at 622. 
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enrollment, the athlete secured various paid opportunities involving modeling, 
television hosting, and product endorsements in the media, some of which were 
associated with his image as an Olympic skier.55 When the NCAA refused to waive 
its rules prohibiting student-athletes from earning compensation for use of their 
NILs, the athlete sought an injunction on the grounds that such restrictions were 
inapplicable to his skiing-related opportunities.56 Reading them as a whole, the 
court concluded that the NCAA bylaws “express[ed] a clear and unambiguous 
intent to prohibit student-athletes from engaging in [paid] endorsements.”57 
Ultimately, the court favored the NCAA despite the NCAA’s inability to interpret 
its own rules when asked to do so,58 and despite evidence that the athlete’s 
endorsement opportunities were the product of his appearance and on-camera 
presence, not his athletic ability.59 
Considering student-athletes have traditionally been unsuccessful in 
challenging the legality of restrictive NCAA bylaws on antitrust grounds, some 
have attempted to argue they are entitled to compensation under labor and 
employment laws.60 Regardless of the approach—whether suing under worker’s 
compensation laws, the National Labor Relations Act, or the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA)—a majority of courts have rejected this argument.61 For instance, in 
Berger v. NCAA, former competitors for the University of Pennsylvania’s women’s 
track and field team sued their school, the NCAA, and 120 other NCAA Division 
I universities and colleges, alleging that student-athletes are “employees” within 
the meaning of the FLSA and therefore entitled to minimum wage.62 In rejecting 
this claim, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the multifactor test it cited as 
determinative in discerning the nature of employment relationships in previous 
cases.63 According to the court, the established multifactor test failed to 
accommodate the longstanding tradition of amateurism that defined the 
economic reality of the relationship at issue, and thus was “not a ‘helpful guide.’”64 
Rather, the court reasoned that student-athletes have committed a “tremendous” 
amount of time to their respective NCAA sports for over a hundred years with no 
expectation of pay and for reasons wholly unrelated to compensation, ultimately 
holding that “play” therefore did not constitute “work” within the meaning of the 
FLSA.65 
Concurring, Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton emphasized that, while the 
amateurism principle pointed toward dismissal in Berger because the plaintiffs 
were not recipients of athletic scholarships and they competed in a non-revenue-
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 626. 
 58. Id. at 627. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate Student-Athlete 
and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 287, 294–97 (2016). 
 61. Id. at 297. 
 62. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 63. Id. at 291. 
 64. Id. (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 65. Id. at 293. 
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generating sport, “economic reality and the tradition of amateurism may not point 
in the same direction” with regard to scholarship athletes in Division I sports that 
generate billions of dollars in revenue.66 Essentially, Judge Hamilton made clear 
that a different set of facts might require the court to afford “room for further 
debate” on the issue of whether student-athletes may be considered employees for 
FLSA purposes.67 
B.  SHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE: JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM TOWARD AMATEURISM 
As the above cases demonstrate, courts have deferred to amateurism in a variety 
of legal contexts despite the fact that the principle does not actually carry the force 
of law.68 However, a 2015 landmark case questioned the validity of the principle 
from both a legal and practical perspective,69 ultimately finding the NCAA’s 
commitment to preserving the amateur nature of college sports an insufficient 
justification for prohibiting student-athletes from being compensated for use of 
their NILs.70 The landmark case was filed by Ed O’Bannon, a former All-
American basketball player from the University of California Los Angeles 
(UCLA), who served as lead plaintiff in the class-action suit after realizing he had 
been depicted in a college basketball video game produced by Electronic Arts 
without his consent.71 Though a character in the video game resembled 
O’Bannon in every detailed aspect down to the number on his UCLA jersey, the 
player never authorized the use of his likeness nor was he ever compensated for 
it.72 O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company, which 
licenses the trademarks of the NCAA and its member schools, on the grounds 
that amateurism rules preventing student-athletes from being compensated for use 
of their NILs placed an illegal restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Act.73 
Judge Claudia Wilken of the Northern District of California agreed with 
O’Bannon, ultimately concluding the NCAA’s prohibition on compensation 
constituted a “price-fixing agreement” in which member colleges collectively 
agreed to value their athletes’ likenesses at zero.74 In dismissing amateurism and 
consumer demand as insufficient justifications for barring student-athletes from 
receiving monetary compensation for NIL rights, Judge Wilken noted the NCAA 
had altered its definition of amateurism over time in order to suit its own 
interests,75 and that other factors, including “school loyalty and geography,” were 
more determinative of consumer demand for college sports than the fact that 
players are not compensated.76 To the extent that a total ban on student-athlete 
 
 66. Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1079. 
 71. Id. at 1055. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 75. Id. at 1000. 
 76. Id. at 1001; see also John Niemeyer, The End of an Era: The Mounting Challenges to the NCAA’s 
Model of Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 916–17 (2015) (summarizing the O’Bannon litigation). 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2021] A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal Legislation 65 
compensation may breed certain procompetitive effects such as academic 
integration, Judge Wilken concluded the NCAA’s procompetitive objectives 
could be preserved equally as well by less-restrictive alternatives, such as allowing 
athletes to receive deferred stipends through a trust system.77 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that NCAA rules 
prohibiting student-athlete compensation for use of NIL are anticompetitive in 
effect and that the organization’s objectives could be accomplished by less 
restrictive means.78 The NCAA attempted to rebut this conclusion by arguing that 
amateurism has a procompetitive effect in broadening student-athletes’ options, 
giving them the only opportunity they will have to play competitive sports while 
earning an education.79 The Ninth Circuit disposed of this counterargument, 
concluding that whether NCAA restrictions broadened educational opportunities 
was irrelevant to the issue at bar.80 If anything, the court noted, loosening or 
abandoning compensation rules might actually be the best way to accomplish the 
goal of broadening student-athletes’ choices, considering “athletes might well be 
more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were 
earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”81 
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
acknowledgment that amateurism breeds procompetitive effects to the extent it 
preserves the popularity of the NCAA’s product and integrates academics with 
athletics.82 Yet, the Ninth Circuit deviated from the lower court’s understanding 
of how these objectives might be accomplished through “less restrictive means,” 
holding that allowing member institutions to offer student-athletes cash payments 
“untethered to educational expenses” would go too far.83 “[I]n finding that paying 
students cash compensation would promote amateurism as well as not paying 
them,” the court stated, “the district court ignored that not paying student-athletes 
is precisely what makes them amateurs.”84 To preserve the line between amateur 
sports and minor league status that allows the college athletics industry to survive, 
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision only to the extent it 
required the NCAA to allow member institutions to compensate their athletes 
directly through deferred cash payments unrelated to educational expenses.85 
Therefore, under O’Bannon, the NCAA’s bylaws violate antitrust principles 
insofar as they prohibit athletes from earning NIL compensation altogether, but 
the NCAA is still authorized to prohibit member institutions from paying athletes 
beyond the cost of attendance.86 
The O’Bannon decision is not only remarkable due to its authorization of 
student-athlete NIL compensation, but also for its skeptical discussion as to 
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whether amateurism should carry weight in a legal sense.87 For example, one of 
the NCAA’s primary defenses in the O’Bannon litigation was based on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.88 
In that case, the Court struck down the NCAA’s then-prevailing rules governing 
television broadcasting of college football games, but it also noted that with 
respect to the organization’s “critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports,” the NCAA was deserving of “ample 
latitude to play that role” because the tradition might die otherwise.89 The NCAA 
relied heavily on this language in defending its restrictive bylaws prohibiting 
student-athlete compensation in O’Bannon, arguing the Court’s directive in Board 
of Regents had the effect of declaring amateurism rules “valid as a matter of law.”90 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, pointing out that the Supreme Court had merely 
deemed NCAA rules not illegal per se and, thus, deserving of the somewhat 
scrutinizing Rule of Reason standard of review where price-fixing is at issue.91 If 
anything, according to the O’Bannon court, the Board of Regents decision 
demonstrates that “not every rule adopted by the NCAA that restricts the market 
is necessary to preserving the ‘character’ of college sports,”92 thereby undermining 
the deferential perspective from which courts have traditionally assessed NCAA 
bylaws.93 
Sensing the favorable legal climate in the Ninth Circuit in light of O’Bannon, 
student-athletes again tested the theory that they were entitled to compensation 
as employees in accordance with the definitions provided by state and federal 
labor laws. In 2017, a football player from the University of Southern California 
(USC) represented NCAA Division I football players in a class-action suit against 
the NCAA and the PAC-12 athletic conference of which USC is a member.94 The 
player alleged that he was entitled to minimum wage as an employee of the NCAA 
and PAC-12, yet was denied pay for all hours worked plus overtime.95 While the 
player attempted to invoke the Berger concurrence96 to argue that the status of 
Division I football players was distinguishable from that of student-athletes 
competing in non-revenue-generating sports, the court ultimately found that the 
weight of both case law and administrative interpretation supported the opposite 
conclusion.97 Citing the Department of Labor’s handbook, the court explained 
that collegiate sports do not constitute “work” under the FLSA because such 
activities are tied to education, and therefore primarily intended to benefit the 
 
 87. See id. at 1061–64. 
 88. See id. at 1061. 
 89. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
 90. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061–63. 
 91. Id. at 1063. 
 92. Id. at 1074. 
 93. See, e.g., Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an NCAA bylaw 
is clearly meant to help maintain the ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the 
‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher education,’ the bylaw will be presumed procompetitive 
. . . .”). 
 94. Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 402–03 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 95. Id. at 403. 
 96. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 97. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406. 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2021] A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal Legislation 67 
participant.98 Holding that no employment relationship exists between student-
athletes and the NCAA—regardless of whether the player participates in a revenue-
generating or non-revenue-generating sport—the court concluded that the 
“plaintiff [was] looking for O’Bannon to carry a weight it cannot shoulder,” because 
there is simply no legal basis for defining student-athletes as employees under the 
FLSA.99 
Despite the limited reach of O’Bannon in the context of employment law, 
however, student-athletes have made significant progress towards securing 
academic benefits beyond the cost of attendance. As of April 2021, the NCAA v. 
Alston plaintiffs currently await decision by the United States Supreme Court on 
the issue of whether NCAA restrictions on the receipt of “non-cash education-
related benefits,” violate the Sherman Act.100 Whereas O’Bannon established the 
right of member institutions to offer full cost-of-attendance scholarships to 
student-athletes, the “benefits” at issue in Alston consist of items including 
“computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other items not 
included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the 
pursuit of various academic studies.”101 Judge Claudia Wilken once again ruled 
against the NCAA at the district court level102 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 
May 2020, agreeing that “caps on non-cash, education-related benefits have no 
demand-preserving effect and, therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”103 
While the Alston case is not directly related to the debate surrounding athletes’ 
NIL rights, the Supreme Court’s possible rejection of amateurism as a legitimate 
claim for denying compensation threatens to upend the NCAA’s enforcement 
power, not to mention its business model. 
IV.  THE AFTERMATH OF O’BANNON: NEW LEGISLATION 
PERMITTING STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION 
In scrutinizing the NCAA’s motivations for perpetuating its restrictive bylaws—
and questioning the validity of the amateurism principle overall—the Ninth 
Circuit paved the way for dramatic measures favoring the rights of student-athletes 
to be introduced through the legislature. O’Bannon also worked to generate public 
support for the notion that athletes deserve compensation for use of their NIL,104 
with celebrities at the forefront of the case bringing attention to the issue in public 
interviews. For instance, along with Ed O’Bannon himself, LeBron James, 
DeMaurice Smith, and Bernie Sanders enthusiastically advocated for the passage 
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of legislation permitting student-athletes to be compensated for use of their NIL 
in the wake of O’Bannon.105 
A.  CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT 
The California legislature quickly took advantage of the momentum 
surrounding the issue of student-athlete compensation, passing Senate Bill 206, 
otherwise known as the Fair Pay to Play Act, in September 2019.106 The Fair Pay 
to Play Act extends the O’Bannon ruling to its logical end, establishing the right 
of student-athletes to earn compensation from commercial use of their names, 
images, and likenesses, as well as the right to hire licensed agents and other athlete 
representatives for assistance in securing and negotiating endorsement 
opportunities.107 While the Act directly defies the amateurism principle to which 
the NCAA remains committed,108 it does not go so far as to allow colleges and 
universities to pay their athletes directly109 and thus reflects current labor and 
employment jurisprudence.110 Rather, the law prohibits universities from 
interfering with commercial opportunities that enable athletes to profit from use 
of their NILs, except where such endorsements would conflict with preexisting 
school sponsorships.111 
The Fair Pay to Play Act received overwhelming bipartisan support from 
lawmakers, with the California Senate voting in favor of the bill 31 to 5 and the 
Assembly unanimously favoring the bill 73 to 0.112 On September 30, 2019, 
California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill 206 into law during an 
appearance on HBO’s “The Shop” hosted by LeBron James.113 The Fair Pay to 
Play Act will not take effect until January 1, 2023,114 providing ample time for 
more legal developments on the issue of student-athlete compensation, which may 
include the passage of similar laws in other states, litigation initiated by the NCAA 
or colleges and universities in states declining to adopt such legislation, or even 
preemption in the form of a comprehensive federal law. 
B.  CALIFORNIA SPARKS A TREND: PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES 
Immediately following the passage of California’s Act, legislators across the 
country garnered support for the passage of similar laws in a number of other 
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states.115 Already, state representatives from Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee have begun advocating for, 
drafting, and proposing bills that would allow student-athletes to be compensated 
for use of their NILs.116 Legislators in Colorado and Florida acted with even 
greater urgency, successfully passing new state laws mirroring California’s during 
their 2020 sessions.117 
While the inspiration for proposed NIL legislation in a number of states 
originated with the Fair Pay to Play Act, certain bills contain unique components 
providing solutions to anticipated problems not addressed in California’s law. For 
instance, like the California Act, a proposed bill in New Jersey purports to allow 
student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs without impacting 
scholarship eligibility, though it would also place limitations on athletes’ ability to 
partake in endorsements to the extent their NIL is used in connection with “adult 
entertainment, alcohol, gambling, tobacco and electronic smoking, 
pharmaceuticals, controlled dangerous substances or firearms.”118 A Florida state 
representative proposed a similar bill, though added a provision for the creation 
of a “Florida College System Athlete Name, Image, & Likeness Task Force” to 
oversee athletes’ endorsements.119 Interestingly, the Florida bill has since been 
signed into law and will take effect during the summer of 2021,120 meaning the 
NCAA’s timeline for preempting a state-by-state movement—and the window for 
constructing an effective solution at the federal level—has been dramatically 
condensed despite California’s law remaining dormant until 2023. 
At least two states are attempting to extend athletes’ compensation rights 
beyond NIL, introducing legislation that would require colleges to pay their 
athletes directly for participation. New York’s bill proposes dividing 15% of the 
revenue generated from athletic ticket sales at all NCAA schools in New York 
among student-athletes.121 Further, the bill contains a provision compelling 
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colleges to create and fund “injured athlete” accounts that would financially 
compensate athletes who suffer career-ending or long-term injuries.122 In South 
Carolina, lawmakers have proposed legislation that would require the state’s 
colleges and universities to pay student-athletes participating in revenue-
generating sports a $5,000 annual stipend.123 
C.  THE NCAA’S REACTION TO NEW LEGISLATION 
In the immediate wake of the Fair Pay to Play Act’s passage, the collegiate sports 
industry did not jump on board with the notion that student-athletes deserve 
compensation for use of their NILs. Larry Scott, the head commissioner for the 
PAC-12 athletic conference, commented that he believed the Act would “lead to 
the professionalization of college sports and many unintended consequences.”124 
Gene Smith, Ohio State University’s athletic director, threatened that he would 
refuse to schedule games against any California schools should the California law 
remain unchanged by the date of its implementation in 2023.125 Even Mark 
Emmert, the president of the NCAA, argued the law would devastate the college 
sports industry by giving certain schools a distinct advantage in attracting talent, 
drawing attention away from non-revenue-generating sports, and rendering 
athletes employees.126 Given these potential consequences and their negative 
impact on the principle of amateurism, Mark Emmert threatened to exclude 
colleges and universities in California from competing in the NCAA 
championships altogether.127 
However, the speed and enthusiasm with which proposals for state laws 
mimicking California’s Fair Pay to Play Act materialized undoubtedly put pressure 
on the NCAA to adjust its position. In fact, the NCAA was forced to accept reality 
toward the end of October 2019, at which point the organization’s top governing 
board unanimously voted to permit student-athletes to benefit from the use of 
their NILs, though “in a manner consistent with the collegiate model.”128 
Following the vote, the NCAA publicized its new stance in a post to its website 
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that vaguely summarized the Board’s decision.129 Board member Michael V. 
Drake is quoted, ambiguously remarking that the NCAA “must embrace change 
to provide the best possible experience for college athletes.”130 The NCAA stated 
its intent to continue gathering feedback on “how best to respond to the state and 
federal legislative environment” through April 2020, and asked each of its 
divisions to create any new rules by January 2021.131 However, the NCAA 
indefinitely halted consideration of all proposed rules in January 2021 in response 
to a letter from the Department of Justice warning of potential antitrust 
violations.132 Thus, even if the NCAA’s shift in tone since the introduction of the 
Fair Pay to Play Act signifies a willingness to cooperate, it remains unclear whether 
the organization will fulfill its promise to bolster the rights of student-athletes 
through permissive NIL policies. 
V.  ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF NEW STATE 
LEGISLATION 
Moving forward, implementing a workable student-athlete compensation 
policy that colleges and universities, the NCAA, and student-athletes themselves 
are willing to comply with presents a formidable task. With only a few months left 
to contemplate its new regulatory scheme before numerous state laws take effect, 
the possibility that the NCAA will place major restrictions on the rights 
articulated in the Fair Pay to Play Act, or even mount a legal challenge against any 
or all of the new state laws, remains conceivable. Moreover, colleges and 
universities in states without Fair Pay to Play legislation may have legitimate 
grievances worthy of judicial intervention that could halt efforts to improve the 
rights of student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs. Irrespective 
of potential roadblocks, the advantages to be gained from revolutionizing the 
college sports industry so as to prioritize the rights of hardworking student-athletes 
over those of wealthy corporations far outweighs the practical and legal challenges 
that inevitably accompany this lofty goal. Therefore, a comprehensive solution in 
the form of federal legislation, which accounts for the nuances and questions left 
unanswered by state legislation, must prevail. 
A.  LEGAL CHALLENGES THREATEN TO FORESTALL THE EXPANSION OF 
STUDENT-ATHLETES’ COMPENSATION RIGHTS 
As with any controversial new law, the possibility that legal challenges will 
subdue or eliminate the effects of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act and affiliated 
legislation remains possible. The media has long suspected that the NCAA plans 
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to launch some sort of judicial attack aimed at preserving amateurism in college 
sports, given the fury with which Mark Emmert promptly responded to the 
announcement of California’s Act.133 While it is true the organization has publicly 
adjusted its stance with regard to student-athlete compensation for endorsements, 
there is no updated timeline for when the NCAA will adopt official regulations 
governing the matter.134 Discrepancies between the NCAA’s understanding of 
appropriate NIL rights compared to the potentially broader rights provided by 
states may give rise to not only litigation, but unworkable conflict.135 In addition, 
colleges and universities—and potentially the regional athletic conferences of 
which they are members—not benefitting from the passage of legislation similar to 
the Fair Pay to Play Act will likely be inclined to sue in light of the distinct 
recruiting advantages colleges in states adopting such legislation will gain. While 
a number of actors may likewise attempt to challenge the legality of the Fair Pay 
to Play Act and other laws, potential suits initiated by the NCAA or colleges and 
universities in the majority of states without such legislation are the most 
threatening. 
1.  Diminishment of Student-Athletes’ Monetization Opportunities by the NCAA Itself 
Since the passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, the NCAA has publicly expressed 
a willingness to adjust its bylaws so as to accommodate new policies permitting 
student-athletes to earn NIL compensation.136 Yet, it remains unclear whether the 
organization is serious about this commitment, considering NCAA leadership 
continues to describe its new strategy in ambiguous terms that could be 
interpreted as merely rebranding amateurism. For instance, the NCAA’s Board of 
Governors established “guiding principles” at the start of its discussions regarding 
new policies in October 2019, which include the following: “maintain[ing] the 
priorities of education and the collegiate experience”; making a “clear distinction 
between collegiate and professional opportunities”; making clear that 
“compensation for athletics performance or participation is impermissible”; 
reaffirming that “student-athletes are students first and not employees of the 
university”; enhancing “diversity, inclusion and gender equity”; and protecting 
the recruiting process.137 Given the NCAA’s persistent emphasis on these same 
tenets of amateurism throughout history, it is unclear whether the organization 
will enact regulations permitting student-athletes to engage in activities 
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traditionally reserved for professional sports, such as hiring agents as allowed 
under the Fair Pay to Play Act.138 At least in theory, permitting such activities 
would seem to directly contradict the principle of amateurism or—as the NCAA 
now calls it—maintaining a “clear distinction between collegiate and professional 
opportunities.”139 
Further, statements by NCAA leadership reflect hesitation toward permissive 
bylaws. For instance, NCAA board member Michael V. Drake claims that 
“modernization” is workable as a “natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA 
members have taken in recent years to improve support for student-athletes, 
including full cost of attendance and guaranteed scholarships.”140 While the 
statement signals an awareness on the part of NCAA leadership that some level 
of modernization is unavoidable, permitting athletes to be paid for endorsement 
opportunities completely unrelated to their education represents a drastic leap 
from a policy guaranteeing scholarships. This stark reality is reflected in a second 
quote by Mr. Drake from the NCAA website, stating that “[a]llowing promotions 
and third-party endorsements is uncharted territory.”141 Taken as a whole, these 
statements suggest not that the NCAA has “bowed down under pressure” as some 
believe,142 but rather that the organization is appeasing lawmakers and the public, 
while in the meantime formulating next steps that will effectively undermine new 
legislation perceived as violating its time-honored amateurism principles. 
Especially now that voting sessions on proposed bylaws are halted indefinitely,143 
the NCAA’s strategy is more ambiguous than ever. 
If the NCAA opts to challenge the legality of the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar 
legislation in court, it is likely to do so on interstate commerce grounds, arguing 
that compliance will be made burdensome or impossible because the state laws at 
issue contain a number of unique and conflicting provisions. In one statement 
following the passage of California’s law, the NCAA hinted at this possibility by 
stating that “a patchwork of different laws from different states will make 
unattainable the goal of providing a fair and level playing field for 1,100 campuses 
and nearly half a million student-athletes nationwide.”144 Thus, even though the 
NCAA has signaled its willingness to comply with state laws permitting athletes 
to receive compensation for endorsement deals on some level, the fact that certain 
states may enact legislation authorizing compensation beyond the realm of NIL 
may be problematic from a compliance standpoint. For instance, proposed 
legislation in both New York and South Carolina purports to require colleges 
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themselves to pay student-athletes directly for their performances under certain 
circumstances, which obviously violates the NCAA’s current policy on 
amateurism145 and may even constitute a legal employment relationship. Even if 
the NCAA were forced to accept the notion that some student-athletes will 
technically be made employees under new state laws, the organization would 
struggle to create a comprehensive set of rules that accommodate such variances 
while maintaining a level playing field for its member institutions in the context 
of recruiting.146 The NCAA can only fulfill its mission of facilitating fair 
competition when all of its member institutions are governed by the same set of 
regulations, otherwise certain schools will gain distinct advantages over others. 
2.  Lawsuits by Colleges and Universities Not Benefitting from New State Laws 
The inevitable discriminatory effect the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar 
legislation will have on the collegiate recruiting process likewise presents fertile 
ground for potential legal challenges. While legislation permitting college athletes 
to receive compensation for NIL is already under consideration in a number of 
states, the majority of states have yet to initiate similar proposals.147 Thus, once 
the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar laws go into effect, only athletes in those 
respective states will be able to profit from lending their images to video game 
publishers, serving as instructors at sponsored summer camps, and negotiating 
endorsement deals with an array of commercial entities ranging from sports 
beverage companies to car dealerships.148 Colleges and universities in states that 
have adopted these laws will undoubtedly gain a leg up in attracting high school 
athletes with the ability to promise not only athletic scholarships, but also 
compensation from lucrative identity-rights deals.149 While that competitive 
advantage is one reason several states have already followed California’s lead, 
passing similar legislation may come with more obstacles in certain states whose 
legislatures are less progressive in this context.150 
In order to circumvent potential discrimination in the recruiting process, 
colleges and universities in states without legislation permitting student-athlete 
compensation may launch a legal attack against existing state laws having that 
effect. The dormant commerce clause provides an attractive theory under which 
these institutions may succeed.151 Generally, the dormant commerce clause 
prohibits state legislatures from passing laws which have a discriminatory effect 
on the economies of other states.152 By invoking this principle, colleges and 
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universities may be successful in arguing that state laws like the Fair Pay to Play 
Act aim to provide their own states’ schools a competitive advantage over those 
in other states and therefore should be invalidated.153 Whether states elect to 
challenge these new laws likely depends on the NCAA’s ultimate stance on 
permitting compensation for endorsements, but as the NCAA struggles to adopt 
updated polices and more states begin drafting and considering new bills, the 
dormant commerce clause may be an effective tool for alleviating competitive 
imbalances in recruiting in the meantime. 
B.  OVERCOMING POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES AND PRACTICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
In light of the legal mechanisms by which the NCAA and collegiate institutions 
may successfully defeat a state-by-state approach to expanding the rights of student-
athletes, a comprehensive federal law may be the only viable method for 
accomplishing such an objective.154 However, the passage of a federal law 
permitting student-athletes to be compensated for endorsements could transform 
the entire college athletics industry in a way that a majority of states have not yet 
expressed a willingness to support. Therefore, greater consideration for the overall 
effects of passing a law similar to the Fair Pay to Play Act on a national scale is 
warranted. In balancing the advantages and drawbacks of allowing student-
athletes to financially benefit from their NIL, this Comment aims to demonstrate 
that the social and economic benefits to result from such a policy far outweigh the 
potential negative consequences. Because the movement in favor of a federal 
solution is justifiable, Congress should seriously consider the passage of a federal 
law that echoes the general principles the Fair Pay to Play Act encompasses, while 
addressing certain practical issues state legislators overlooked. 
1.  Social and Economic Benefits to be Gained from Expanding the Rights of Student-
Athletes 
a.  Providing Monetization Opportunities as a Matter of Basic Fairness 
The primary argument driving the rapid passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, and 
perhaps the reason state legislators intuitively supported the bill, was that of basic 
economic fairness.155 State representatives in California pointed to the fact that 
every other college student with a talent or skill has the right to earn compensation 
from marketing themselves through social media and endorsement deals.156 For 
example, collegiate musicians may benefit financially from selling their music on 
streaming platforms such as Spotify and iTunes, playing concerts, and selling their 
own merchandise, regardless of whether they also receive scholarship money to 
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perform with their school’s marching band, orchestra, or theater department.157 
Moreover, within the college sports industry itself, athletes are grossly 
undercompensated compared to those who manage and regulate sporting 
competitions and ultimately profit from the labor of student-athletes. The 
University of Alabama’s head football coach, Nick Saban, earned a whopping $8.8 
million in 2019 alone, with most SEC football coaches earning upwards of $3 
million as well.158 Executives for athletic conferences and the NCAA are even 
more well-paid than coaches in some instances; the NCAA’s Mark Emmert made 
$3.9 million in 2018.159 From a fairness perspective, the notion that corporate 
leaders and coaches—none of whom actually compete in the sports from which 
they profit—are earning millions of dollars while the athletes whose labor 
generates that profit are limited to scholarship funding, seems inherently 
problematic. 
The argument that athletes deserve to be paid as a matter of basic fairness is 
even more compelling given the statistics on student-athlete poverty. According 
to a study conducted by the National College Players Association, 85% of student-
athletes, including those receiving scholarship money, live below the poverty 
line.160 Yet, given the astronomical cost of college tuition, it may seem 
counterintuitive to argue that student-athletes are taken advantage of in only 
receiving a scholarship.161 Critics who oppose compensating student-athletes 
claim not only that scholarships are extremely valuable in their own right, but also 
that permitting a student to be compensated solely for athletic prowess 
“undermin[es] the value of . . . a highly discounted education.”162 However, these 
criticisms overlook reality and the obvious need for a more permissive policy on 
student-athlete compensation. 
Realistically, athletic scholarships do little to assist impoverished student-
athletes during their college years or once they graduate. Some athletes in the 
NCAA’s Divisions I and II do receive full scholarships, but the average NCAA 
athletic scholarship only provides $10,409 to $14,270 annually,163 and Division 
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III athletes are ineligible for athletic scholarships in any amount.164 The 53% of 
student-athletes who are able to receive some level of financial aid from athletics 
are required to dedicate that funding toward the cost of tuition, room and board, 
books, and transportation to class.165 As a result, athletes are commonly unable to 
afford out-of-pocket expenses, especially in light of the fact that their weekly 
schedules would not accommodate a part-time job even if NCAA rules permitted 
it.166 Also, athletes who suffer career-ending injuries not only struggle to pay 
medical bills, but also are often forced to drop out of their college or university 
because they are no longer able to cover tuition without the assistance of an 
athletic scholarship.167 Of those athletes who avoid an injury and happen to 
compete in one of the six NCAA sports for which a professional league exists, 
only 2% are able to monetize their talent by playing professionally after college.168 
As for the other 98%, they graduate without a future in the field they have 
dedicated endless time and effort to during their college years, without having 
ever been compensated for a single practice, game, or endorsement, and without 
the benefit of having properly focused on academic progress and career 
development. Ultimately, the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar laws represent a 
positive societal shift toward recognizing student-athletes as uniquely talented 
individuals who not only deserve to profit from use of their likeness as a marketing 
tool, but also to excel as athletes without the brunt of poverty impacting their 
experience during college. 
b.  Equalizing Opportunity for Athletes Competing in Sports Without 
Professional Leagues 
Legislation permitting student-athletes to benefit financially from use of their 
NILs will breed greater equality in college sports by allowing athletes who compete 
in non-revenue-generating sports to earn compensation, where doing so would 
otherwise be impossible at any point in their athletic careers. Whereas NCAA 
regulations have prohibited all student-athletes—including men’s football and 
basketball players, whose programs generate the most revenue—from earning NIL 
compensation in the past, the possibility that valuable training in college athletics 
will translate into multi-million dollar professional contracts has been available 
only to a limited class of athletes competing in one of the six sports for which a 
professional league exists.169 Some argue that permitting student-athletes to be 
compensated for NIL through a policy similar to the Fair Pay to Play Act will only 
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perpetuate this inequity, because men’s football and women’s volleyball players, 
for example, will earn disproportionate income from paid endorsement deals.170 
However, this argument, albeit probably correct, fails to provide a justification for 
continuing to deny the right of compensation to athletes who compete in sports 
that traditionally fail to generate revenue and lack lucrative post-graduate 
opportunities. 
The first-hand experiences of student-athletes forced to turn down an array of 
opportunities for personal and career development demonstrate the need for 
federal legislation permitting athlete compensation for use of NIL, even if its 
effects ultimately do financially benefit some more than others. For instance, 
UCLA gymnast Katelyn Ohashi passionately served as a co-sponsor on the Fair 
Pay to Play Act after calling out the NCAA for her inability to profit from a video 
of her record-breaking, perfect-ten floor routine that went viral following a 
collegiate gymnastics meet.171 In addition to being denied the right to profit from 
the video of her routine that was viewed over 100 million times online, Ohashi 
was forced to turn down book deals and speaking engagements in order to 
“preserve the amateur status that allowed her to stay on scholarship.”172 In light 
of her obligation to reject these opportunities, Ohashi spoke out about feeling 
“handcuffed” by restrictive policies that prevented her from deriving any financial 
benefit from her own name and likeness, regardless of the fact that she had zero 
opportunity to join a professional league following graduation.173 Ohashi’s story 
demonstrates the positive impact federal legislation stripping the NCAA’s to 
restrict student-athlete NIL compensation will have on athletes whose only 
opportunities to earn money in recognition of extraordinary talent and work ethic 
arise during their college years. The possibility that some athletes may not benefit 
from such legislation at all, while others will benefit ten-fold compared to others, 
is undeniable. Yet, the existence of such disparities is not a justification for 
continuing to deny student-athletes the right to benefit from their NIL, especially 
those whose individual marketability is inherently short-lived due to factors 
outside their control. 
c.  Avoiding the Imposition of Affirmative Obligations on the Part of 
Colleges and Universities 
Another benefit of legislation permitting student-athletes to profit from NIL is 
that such a policy leaves colleges and universities out of the controversy, allowing 
them to dedicate revenue across athletic programs as needed while avoiding 
violations of Title IX or the FLSA that may be implicated where schools are 
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required to pay their athletes directly.174 Some criticize the Fair Pay to Play Act 
and similar proposed legislation as undermining the purpose of Title IX by 
facilitating unequal compensation as previously discussed, but Title IX would only 
be implicated in a scenario where colleges were providing unequal funding to 
athletes directly.175 
By limiting the expansion of students’ rights to the realm of NIL, any legal 
implications concerning misuse of federal funding will be avoided. Colleges and 
universities, athletic conferences, and the NCAA will avoid legal challenges 
arguing that this form of compensation renders student-athletes “employees” of 
such institutions, given that any compensation the athletes earn will be the 
product of negotiations with brands and sponsors not associated with the college 
sports industry itself.176 Certain provisions in some proposed laws, such as the 
New York bill requiring colleges to divide 15% of revenue from ticket sales among 
student-athletes,177 may be viewed in a different light, however. Instead of 
litigating whether such provisions violate federal requirements in a lengthy, state-
by-state judicial process, the passage of a comprehensive federal law provides a 
more effective means for delineating the outer limit of a workable policy on 
student-athletes’ rights to compensation for use of their NILs. 
d.  Circumventing the “Amateurism” Excuse 
The NCAA’s reliance on the principle of amateurism as a justification for 
refusing to share its astronomical profits with those who generate them no longer 
suffices to prevent student-athletes from earning compensation for use of their 
NILs. For decades, courts blindly deferred to the NCAA’s assertion that the very 
existence of collegiate athletics depended on the preservation of amateurism, 
allowing the organization’s restrictive bylaws governing compensation to endure 
without scrutiny.178 However, viewing amateurism as a veil behind which the 
NCAA knowingly exploits student-athletes, student athletes and sports industry 
critics alike have generated overwhelming opposition to those bylaws in light of 
the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to defer to the principle in O’Bannon.179 Surely, the 
NCAA’s recognition of shifting societal views regarding amateurism was a primary 
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driver in its decision to consider adjusting its policies on compensation for 
endorsements as discussed, but the possibility that the NCAA finds support in 
amateurism remains to some extent, especially if NCAA v. Alston is decided in its 
favor. 
Even amidst an outpouring of criticism over the NCAA’s practices, some 
athletes and scholars argue that quashing amateurism will result in the destruction 
of a time-honored tradition that offers innumerable benefits to society.180 For 
instance, former University of Florida college football player and Heisman Trophy 
recipient Tim Tebow expressed his dissatisfaction with the Fair Pay to Play Act in 
an interview, remarking that compensating players would change what makes 
college football special and would effectively transform the sport into the NFL.181 
Tebow further defended his belief on the grounds that sports should be about 
following your dreams and supporting your teammates and institution without 
concern for which team is willing to offer the most money.182 
While Tebow’s commentary reflects the positive sentiments associated with 
amateurism that enabled restrictive NCAA bylaws to circumvent scrutiny for 
decades, his position fails to account for the majority of students whose dreams 
do not pan out quite as planned. Tebow is a statistical oddity as one of the 2% of 
college athletes who go on to play for a professional league183 and the first 
sophomore in NCAA history to become a Heisman winner.184 Given his 
extraordinary talents and likelihood of earning a draft spot in the NFL, it makes 
sense that Tebow maintained the conviction to focus on high-level athletic 
performance in exchange for other aspects of the college experience during his 
undergraduate years. However, the “dream” is not what it seems for many college 
athletes, especially those who are not standout talents viewed as eligible for a 
professional league or those who compete in a non-revenue-generating sport that 
may not even offer professional opportunities. 
One example of an athlete whose experiences demonstrate the perils of 
amateurism is Stephanie Campbell, a Villanova University graduate who played 
women’s field hockey throughout all four of her undergraduate years and even 
served as team captain.185 Upon graduating high school and accepting a $19,000 
athletic scholarship, Stephanie genuinely believed she was headed toward her 
dream.186 Almost immediately, however, she realized her experience would be 
nothing of the sort—balancing academics and athletics would be impossible given 
her rigorous practice schedule and staying on the team would require sacrificing 
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any semblance of a personal life.187 In spite of feeling completely overwhelmed 
and unmotivated, Stephanie’s parents made clear that staying on scholarship 
needed to be her first priority, and that she needed to start viewing her athletic 
commitments as a job because no other institution would provide comparable 
financial support.188 Unfortunately, this type of experience reflects the norm, not 
the exception, in college athletics.189 Many athletes from Division I universities 
report upholding their commitment to participate in college athletics solely for 
the benefit of receiving their scholarship money each semester,190 which 
completely undermines the presumption on which the NCAA’s amateurism 
theory depends—that college athletes play for the love of the game and not for 
compensation.191 
Opponents may argue that permitting student-athletes to earn compensation 
for use of NIL will only perpetuate the issue by incentivizing athletes to pursue 
collegiate opportunities solely for the sake of making money from sports-related 
endorsements.192 However, anecdotal data from college athletes suggests financial 
hardships and a general lack of resources for non-revenue sports—which in turn 
impart a fundraising responsibility on student-athletes to secure necessities like 
sweatpants or batting gloves—impose a great deal of stress on student-athletes that 
is not alleviated by receipt of a partial scholarship and may even contribute to 
their loss of love for the sport.193 Perhaps if student-athletes were empowered to 
remedy those monetary burdens through endorsement opportunities, fewer 
stressors would impede their enjoyment of athletics. Moreover, student-athletes 
would be highly motivated to improve their skills and share that expertise with 
aspiring college athletes, if unrestrained from capitalizing on their ability to 
instruct others. 
The notion that self-interest will breed a more motivated generation of college 
athletes may be off-putting, but it simply encompasses the “deeply American 
concept” of engaging in hard work in order to earn something valuable, which 
proponents for amateurism cannot deny underlies the collegiate system and 
American society more broadly.194 Thus, while the principle of amateurism is 
honorable in some respects due its encouragement of love for the sport, deference 
to the tradition is neither owed in a legal sense, nor does it fairly accommodate 
the hardships associated with modern collegiate athletics. 
2.  Practical Concerns Associated with Athletes’ NIL Rights 
On its face, a policy granting student-athletes the right to monetize their NILs 
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appears to constitute a moral victory in terms of shifting wealth and power away 
from the NCAA and into the hands of the student-athletes themselves.195 
However, critics suggest that in shrouding new student-athlete compensation 
policies in principled language, state legislators including Nancy Skinner of the 
California Senate—who spearheaded the passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act—have 
completely overlooked certain practical considerations that will make such 
policies logistically unworkable, irrespective of noble intent.196 Criticisms of the 
Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny are generally concerned with preventing the 
exploitation of high school student-athletes,197 correcting misconceptions about 
the financial state of the NCAA and college athletics programs more generally,198 
and drawing attention to the potential for broad-based NIL legislation to facilitate 
corruption in college sports.199 While each of these issues poses a logistical hurdle, 
they are not so problematic as to render student-athlete compensation for use of 
NIL an unworkable task. Rather, these issues only underscore the need for a 
solution at the federal level in the form of comprehensive legislation that accounts 
for these practical challenges. 
a.  Potential Exploitation of High School Athletes and Overall Impact on 
Recruiting 
The passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act was immediately met with pushback 
from those advocating on behalf of high school athletes, who argue the California 
statute and its progeny will devastate the college recruiting process. For instance, 
the National Federation of State High School Associations—the high school 
equivalent of the NCAA—published an article in November 2019 that criticizes 
the inaugural statute’s provisions and its potential impact on the recruiting 
process at the lower education level.200 While the Fair Pay to Play Act does not 
extend NIL rights to high school student-athletes,201 it is possible that companies 
seeking high-profile athletes for future endorsement deals will succumb to 
competition and begin recruiting endorsers prematurely, potentially before they 
even reach high school.202 Specifically, companies may pursue athletes either by 
directly reaching out to students and their families, or “through the wide variety 
of ‘handlers’ who for decades have created havoc in the sports world by often 
acting in their own self-interest as opposed to the best interests of young student-
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athletes.”203 Even with the barrier of high school athletic directors and coaches 
who will presumably act in student-athletes’ best interests, critics are anxious that 
protecting young athletes from exploitation will be made difficult or impossible 
once companies view athletes as marketing tools with monetary value.204 
b.  Misconceptions About the Financial Position of the NCAA and College 
Athletics Departments 
Some critics oppose the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny on grounds that 
perceptions about the financial position of the NCAA and college athletics 
programs more broadly are misinformed, and that state legislators lack the 
necessary expertise to reform the sports industry in an economically feasible 
manner.205 For instance, while the general public assumes university athletics 
programs are “rolling in the dough,” the NCAA reports that only twenty-four 
athletic departments in the country turned a profit in 2015, and that “the median 
loss among 129 schools in the Football Bowl Subdivision—the sport’s highest 
college level with the highest revenue streams—was $18 million” that year.206 
Given these statistics, some are concerned that athletic departments will suffer 
further financial distress once brands realize they can pay individual athletes 
directly, and at a lower cost, as opposed to negotiating with university athletic 
programs for the participation of entire sports teams in marketing campaigns.207 
The fact that supporters of the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny have placed 
emphasis on remedying a system that unfairly restrains the rights of student-
athletes as individuals208 without fully contemplating the potential economic 
implications for third-parties suggests that more attention should be paid to the 
financial logistics of NIL rights prior to the implementation of new policies. 
c.  Risks Inherent in Opening Pandora’s Box 
In addition to the practical challenges associated with transforming the college 
sports industry through legislation, the notion that a law permitting student-
athletes to benefit from use of their NIL will open “Pandora’s Box” is a genuine 
concern shared by many.209 Larry Scott, the commissioner of the PAC-12 
Conference, expressed this sentiment in an interview, arguing the Fair Pay to Play 
Act would “effectively create a free-for-all in which large payments to a relative 
handful of star athletes from boosters and others could be thinly disguised as 
payment for the use of their name, image and likeness.”210 Essentially, critics fear 
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the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny will make it impossible to restrict wealthy 
alumni from paying student-athletes directly because such transfers will be 
deemed legal so long as some service or commodity, such as an autographed jersey, 
is exchanged under the guise of an “endorsement.”211 While the aforementioned 
practical oversights represent legitimate concerns, they may be effectively solved 
by the implementation of a comprehensive federal law addressing such issues. 
VI.  THE SOLUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LAW 
PERMITTING STUDENT-ATHLETES TO EARN COMPENSATION FOR 
USE OF THEIR NILS 
Considering the social and economic advantages to be gained from legislation 
authorizing student-athlete compensation for NIL, the implementation of a 
federal law represents the most efficient and equitable method for establishing a 
more evenhanded dynamic between college athletes and the all-powerful NCAA, 
as envisioned by California legislators in passing the Fair Pay to Play Act. While 
critics eagerly point to several practical considerations state legislators have 
overlooked thus far,212 their concerns—which are admittedly valid—could be 
wholly alleviated by a comprehensive federal law. In fact, several members of 
Congress have already introduced bills addressing NIL rights in collegiate sports. 
Representative Mark Walker led the way by proposing a bill in March 2019 that 
would alter the tax code so as to “force the NCAA to allow players to make money 
from endorsements or risk losing their nonprofit tax exemptions.”213 While this 
effort contributed to the pressure mounting against the NCAA’s amateurism 
policy in 2019, the NCAA’s recent declaration that it will give student-athletes a 
right to earn compensation from endorsements on some level suggests Walker’s 
proposal may be redundant to the extent it merely establishes the same right. 
Building on the momentum from Walker’s bill, several congressmen 
introduced more thorough proposals in 2020 meant to expand protections for 
college athletes beyond merely establishing NIL rights, though some afford undue 
deference to the NCAA. For instance, Representative Anthony Gonzalez—a 
former Ohio State University football star—introduced the Gonzalez-Cleaver bill 
in September 2020 together with Representative Emmanuel Cleaver.214 While the 
proposal would allow student-athletes to earn compensation through 
endorsements, it also “satisfies several NCAA requests” such as preempting state 
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drugs, alcohol, gambling, or adult entertainment.215 Senator Marco Rubio’s bill 
likewise preempts state NIL laws and also blatantly panders to the NCAA by 
exempting the organization from antitrust scrutiny.216 At the other end of the 
spectrum, however, more player-friendly proposals may struggle to garner 
bipartisan support because of their broad scope. For instance, Senator Cory 
Booker introduced the “College Athletes Bill of Rights” in December 2020, which 
would guarantee NCAA athletes “monetary compensation, long-term health care, 
lifetime educational scholarships and even revenue sharing.”217 
While the above proposals expired at the end of the 2019–2020 congressional 
session, they laid the foundation for key legislative debates and may be 
reintroduced in 2021. Yet, each fails to adequately balance the rights of student-
athletes against the business interests of the NCAA in a manner that would not 
only pass bipartisan scrutiny, but also be workable in a practical sense. Thus, the 
remainder of this Comment outlines a framework for a comprehensive federal 
law authorizing student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs, with 
a focus on protecting athletes’ rights from being compromised by the NCAA while 
providing innovative solutions to the practical concerns identified in the previous 
section. 
A.  ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ENFORCEMENT BODY TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION 
AND RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER STUDENT-ATHLETES’ NIL RIGHTS 
The establishment of an enforcement body to monitor compliance with a new 
federal law will be essential to effective implementation and continued oversight 
of rules governing student-athlete compensation. The Fair Pay to Play Act 
noticeably lacks any type of enforcement mechanism, leaving universities and 
athletes in the dark as to how potential violations will be reported and resolved.218 
On the same token, the Act fails to provide any information about the 
consequences of a violation, in terms of whether civil or criminal liability will 
attach and who is subject to liability in the first place.219 In crafting a new federal 
law, Congress should preempt litigation on the subject of how to adjudicate 
disputes in this area by identifying the appropriate enforcement agents. 
Currently, the NCAA’s own legislative bodies oversee and manage all topics 
“affecting sports rules, championships, health and safety, matters impacting 
women in athletics and opportunities for minorities.”220 Considering the NCAA 
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is currently developing policies on compensation for student-athlete endorsement 
opportunities, the organization would presumably assert jurisdiction over such 
policies as falling within the definition of “sports rules.” However, the NCAA’s 
governance structure consists of volunteers from member schools for each of the 
three NCAA divisions, plus a Board of Governors which consists of presidents 
and chancellors from all divisions.221 In light of the extremely negative initial 
reaction by NCAA leaders regarding state legislation permitting paid student-
athlete endorsements,222 it seems unlikely the organization would be inclined to 
regulate compensation-related issues evenhandedly, without attempting to slowly 
undermine the impact of NIL rights. Moreover, the fact that a majority of 
individuals involved in NCAA governance work for universities suggests the 
financial interests of the enforcement body would be unlikely to align with those 
of student-athletes if the organization were authorized to enforce NIL rules.223 
Thus, Congress should consider granting authority to an independent regulatory 
body as it crafts a new federal law, to minimize the possibility that conflicts of 
interest will interfere with just enforcement. 
The notion that an independent enforcement body should be implemented is 
not entirely novel, considering a failed bill in Florida sought to establish a 
government-run task force to oversee student-athletes’ NIL rights in the state.224 
Still, a creative solution is necessary to facilitate enforcement at the federal level. 
State-by-state enforcement would be ineffective in the sense that each state’s “task 
force” would be incentivized to design an enforcement scheme that favors its own 
athletes if comprised of university-affiliated officials, and different states might 
interpret uniform standards inconsistently. In addition, attempting to enforce 
policies and adjudicate violations involving multiple schools in different states 
could create confusion over jurisdiction and yield varying outcomes. Thus, a more 
sensible solution would involve delegating enforcement power to a task force 
within the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as proposed by the Gonzalez-Cleaver 
bill,225 which could appropriately promulgate endorsement policies, adjudicate 
unfair competition disputes, and work in connection with law enforcement 
agencies to promote fair competition and the protection of consumers.226 
The FTC’s goals already directly parallel those underlying the movement to 
grant NIL rights to student-athletes,227 and its clear-cut adjudicatory proceedings 
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would serve as the ideal mechanism for resolving endorsement-related disputes 
without unnecessarily involving courts in matters that likely do not warrant the 
imposition of civil or criminal liability. Additionally, granting the FTC—a well-
established entity that has famously cracked down on unfair methods of 
competition since 1915228—the responsibility to oversee new student-athlete 
compensation regulations will provide a sense of stability and predictability in a 
rapidly changing industry, whereas the uncertainties associated with introducing 
a new enforcement mechanism would only put Fair Pay legislation on even 
shakier grounds. 
Moreover, empowering the FTC to investigate corruption in this realm would 
effectively address concerns about the opening of “Pandora’s Box,” considering 
alumni and boosters may in fact be tempted to camouflage direct payments as 
endorsement opportunities.229 Perhaps an FTC task force could promulgate 
standardized valuations for various endorsement opportunities based on the 
market value of such endorsements at the professional level, adjusting for college 
athletes’ geographic location and skill level. Then, when an individual or 
commercial entity pays an athlete directly in exchange for their endorsement, the 
federal task force will be responsible for investigating such payments to the extent 
they unreasonably exceed the standardized valuation. 
B.  IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKABLE AND FAIR RECRUITING REGULATIONS 
Effectively implementing federal legislation that authorizes student-athlete 
compensation also depends on the law’s inclusion of workable high school 
recruitment guidelines. The risk that colleges will be capable of poaching already-
young athletes earlier and earlier in their sports careers by luring them in with the 
promise of lucrative endorsements is viewed as threatening the integrity of 
athletics altogether.230 The task of drafting guidelines for high school recruitment 
is complicated by the variable timing of athletes’ decisions to commit to college 
sports teams. In general, NCAA regulations currently restrict colleges from 
contacting athletes about collegiate opportunities until June fifteenth following a 
high school student’s sophomore year, or September first of the student’s junior 
year, depending on the sport, division level, and type of communication.231 
Codifying the NCAA’s rules regarding initial outreach would actually be an 
effective solution to concerns regarding extremely young athletes being subjected 
to recruitment efforts, as the law would require colleges to hold off on contacting 
athletes until the summer before their junior year at the earliest.232 Under the 
current NCAA framework, many athletes commit to colleges as early as eighth 
grade through informal “verbal commitments” because the NCAA turns a blind 
 
 228. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/X658-RFFW]. 
 229. See Green, supra note 155. 
 230. Id. 
 231. NCAA Recruiting Rules: When Can College Coaches Contact High School Athletes, NEXT COLL. 
STUDENT ATHLETE, https://www.ncsasports.org/ncaa-eligibility-center/recruiting-rules 
[https://perma.cc/8ABZ-Z8YK]. 
 232. See id. 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
88 SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 74:55 
eye to violations of its self-imposed deadlines.233 In elevating the NCAA’s 
restrictions on timing to the status of federal law and tasking an enforcement body 
to investigate and punish violations of such restrictions, colleges would be forced 
to comply with a system that more fairly allocates opportunity for schools by 
ensuring all are prohibited from gaining a “leg up” in recruiting. At the same time, 
athletes would be encouraged to spend more time exploring their options instead 
of committing prematurely. 
In addition to guidelines surrounding the timing of initial outreach by 
collegiate recruiters, provisions governing the ability of colleges to offer 
endorsement opportunities as a recruiting tool are necessary to preserve fair 
competition among schools. Proposing endorsement opportunities during 
recruiting would not only give certain colleges an unfair advantage but also put 
undue pressure on high school student-athletes to sacrifice college experiences 
that may best suit them in order to pursue promises of monetary gain. While those 
potential consequences are undoubtedly problematic, one solution could involve 
a statutory provision imposing exorbitant fines—and even personal liability—
against collegiate representatives who broach the subject of endorsement 
opportunities with high school athletes not officially committed to the college’s 
athletic program. Colleges should be given discretion to inform their student-
athletes about endorsement opportunities only after athletes have officially ended 
their recruitment by signing a legally binding National Letter of Intent (NLI) 
committing to a school during their senior year of high school.234 
As for when athletes become eligible to receive compensation for participating 
in endorsement opportunities, the NLI provisions suggest restricting athletes from 
receiving payments until at least the first day of college classes in the fall would be 
prudent.235 For instance, a student-athlete’s NLI, though legally binding, becomes 
null and void if it turns out he or she is denied admission to the college, fails to 
meet NCAA eligibility requirements, fails to graduate from their two-year college 
if transferring, or violates recruiting rules before opening day in the fall.236 Based 
on the number of contingencies that may dissolve the relationship between a 
student-athlete and the college they have made an official commitment to, 
restricting compensation until the first day of school protects both parties to the 
NLI by ensuring student-athletes are actually eligible to compete during the year. 
Some may argue that certain collegiate sports, including football, would be 
disadvantaged by such a policy given that their seasons begin in the summer and, 
therefore, depend on marketing strategies rolled out in the spring. One workable 
solution would be to allow high school athletes to participate in endorsements 
any time after they sign an NLI, yet remain ineligible to receive compensation for 
such work until opening day, in the form of a deferred payment. 
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C.  MANDATING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG STUDENT-ATHLETES 
In addition to protecting high school athletes by imposing stringent regulations 
on the recruiting front, federal legislators should consider mandating some form 
of educational program aimed at supporting collegiate student-athletes as they 
attempt to manage finances related to compensation for the use of NIL rights. 
Student-athletes should be allowed to embrace their full monetization potential 
by contracting with licensed sports agents as permitted under the Fair Pay to Play 
Act,237 considering professional agents are best-equipped to negotiate on behalf of 
athletes and to ensure marketing deals involve reputable brands that will benefit 
their clients.238 While the opportunity to seek out endorsements through an agent 
will increase the likelihood of student-athletes profiting from use of their NILs, 
athletes as young as seventeen or eighteen years likely have minimal to no 
experience managing finances or properly filing taxes.239 Yet, the tax code requires 
individuals receiving compensation for use of NIL to report such income on their 
federal tax returns.240 Further, the majority of states impose a state income tax, 
which incites confusion for athletes whose residency and in-state activities vary 
depending on where opportunities arise.241 Because student-athletes may be ill-
equipped to realize the financial responsibilities associated with collecting NIL 
payments, Congress should strongly consider implementing a provision that 
mandates colleges and universities to provide financial literacy courses to their 
athletes. Perhaps federal funding could even be directed toward assigning CPAs 
and attorneys specializing in tax issues to guide college athletes through the filing 
process. 
D.  IMPOSITION OF LIMITS ON STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS 
Lastly, as a practical matter, successfully implementing a federal student-athlete 
compensation law requires understanding the financial state of college athletics 
programs overall and designing systems that are economically feasible for colleges. 
As discussed, while men’s football and basketball programs within a specific 
subset of elite athletic departments do generate considerable revenue, the majority 
of athletic programs in the United States, and dozens of teams even at top-earning 
schools, lose millions of dollars every year.242 Thus, while a bill like New York’s, 
which proposes dividing 15% of revenue generated from athletic ticket sales to be 
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shared among student-athletes,243 may be feasible for a few schools, the reality is 
that most college athletics programs are already struggling to stay afloat as the 
industry becomes increasingly commercialized.244 The COVID-19 pandemic has 
only made matters worse, as the effective cancellation of sporting events for the 
larger part of 2020 caused severe losses in ticket sales and other revenue streams 
for university sports.245 For example, the University of Michigan lost almost half 
of its $200 million athletic budget due to COVID-19.246 Several colleges were 
forced to eradicate sports teams altogether during 2020 if they did not generate 
sufficient revenue.247 Given that ticket sales are a vital source of income for 
athletic departments in combination with alumni donations and TV rights,248 
requiring schools to redirect that portion of their revenue to student-athletes 
would only worsen the economic state of collegiate athletics overall. 
In order to protect athletic programs from descending further into debt, 
Congress should consider alternative provisions that aim to compensate schools 
in the event sponsors begin focusing their monetary contributions on individual 
athletes instead of contributing to athletic programs as a whole. Perhaps, Congress 
could impose an additional tax on businesses that hire student-athletes for 
product endorsements, then use the revenue to establish a federal program aimed 
at supporting collegiate athletic teams. In this way, student-athletes could still 
retain their full NIL compensations and schools would ultimately benefit from 
allowing their student-athletes to engage with paid opportunities. Overall, while 
it is true certain practical considerations were overlooked in the drafting of the 
Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny, a federal law represents the best avenue 
through which to resolve complex legal and financial issues through creative 
solutions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
No longer does amateurism suffice to justify the NCAA’s immunity from 
scrutiny in society at large or within the court system. No longer should student-
athletes be forced to sacrifice their bodies, academic potential, and futures for the 
sake of generating revenue for a corporation that brings in $1 billion a year, which 
it is too greedy to share. While these principles are agreeable in theory, the 
difficulty and complexity of constructing a workable legislative solution on a state-
by-state basis threatens to undermine efforts to grant athletes NIL rights. Thus, in 
order to constrain the NCAA’s dominance in the face of practical challenges 
associated with an entirely new athlete compensation system, Congress should 
take preemptive action to ensure the NIL rights of college athletes are respected. 
Thankfully, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle are demonstrating 
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support for a federal solution resembling the Fair Pay to Play Act, suggesting that 
the rights of student-athletes are being taken seriously. As of April 2021, at least 
seven congressional bills addressing collegiate NIL compensation have been 
introduced and two are currently under consideration. The “College Athlete 
Economic Freedom Act,” proposed by Senator Chris Murphy and Representative 
Lori Trahan, would secure athletes a virtually unrestrained right to earn NIL 
income and even to organize trade unions.249 Perhaps more likely to garner 
bipartisan support, Senator Jerry Moran’s “Amateur Athletes Protection and 
Compensation Act of 2021” takes a middle ground approach—more in alignment 
with the framework this Comment recommends—by placing reasonable 
limitations on endorsement opportunities without pandering to the NCAA 
through safe harbor provisions as in Senator Rubio’s bill.250 In any event, 
immediate congressional action is necessary to preclude the NCAA from raising 
practical objections to the several state laws going into effect this year. Thus, 
instead of continuing to introduce multiple variations on the same right through 
numerous legislative proposals, Congress should focus on joining forces to finally 
overthrow the NCAA’s archaic and injurious regime as soon as possible. 
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